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Firm exports exhibit a geographical pattern. Not only do di￿erent ￿rms
serve di￿erent numbers of countries but also the spatial distribution of those
countries di￿ers heavily across ￿rms. In this paper, we provide evidence
for a previously unexplored dimension of country-￿rm speci￿c heterogene-
ity: Firms tend to enter new markets which are geographically close and
culturally related to their prior export destinations.1 This spatial concen-
tration of export markets may be due to the crucial need for gathering local
information from trading partners.2 Di￿erent local information then may
lead to di￿erent trade networks across ￿rms. In addition, correlation of de-
mand patterns across countries or common cultural aspects may lead ￿rms
to adapt their products to the preferences of their consumers.3 As a conse-
quence, if trade barriers fall, ￿rms will expand their export destinations not
randomly but following a clear spatial pattern.
To quantify the cross-country correlation of ￿rms export decisions, we
rely on the frequency of new markets entered by a ￿rm which are contiguous
to one of its prior export destinations.4 However, to ensure that this is a
systematic pattern of the underlying ￿rm decisions, we need to compare it
with the probability that would arise if the ￿rm were choosing its new desti-
nations randomly (see Armenter and Koren, 2010). Each ￿rm has a di￿erent
probability to randomly choose a contiguous new destination which depends
1Recent theoretical and empirical contributions have identi￿ed the importance of coun-
try speci￿c ￿rm heterogeneity (see Kee and Krishna, 2008; Bernard et al., 2011 and Eaton
et al., 2011).
2For instance, an exporting ￿rm may gain access to a new export market via a multi-
national retailer which already serves a third country. As the network of subsidiaries of
wholesalers and of multinational ￿rms tends to expand spatially (see Basker, 2005 and
Defever, forthcoming), this mechanism also implies a spread of exports to contiguous
countries. In addition to geography, cultural closeness can also generate a similar pattern
through networks of ethnically-related ￿rms. For instance, networks may reduce search
costs as ￿rms may learn about potential suitable suppliers within their ethnic community
(see for instance Rauch, 2001). Recently, Chaney (2011) has developed a model describing
trade patterns as an international network. Firms tend to build on their network for ￿nd-
ing new trading partners, similar to social interactions between individuals (see Jackson
and Rogers, 2007).
3For example, if preferences among nearby countries are similar, ￿rms pro￿tability will
be correlated geographically. In addition, common cultural aspects can generate such
correlation (see Combes et al., 2005).
4The frequency would be equal to two-thirds for a ￿rm entering three new destinations,
from which two of them have a common border with one of its prior export markets.
1on the number of potential new destinations, the number of these new mar-
kets which are contiguous with a prior export destination and also on the
number of new market that the ￿rm chooses to enter. Conditioning on these
￿rm characteristics, one can easily calculate the probability for a randomly
chosen country to be contiguous to a prior export destination, and compare
it with the empirical probability observed in the data.5 As an illustration,
consider a sample of Chinese ￿rms which have to decide which new markets
to enter in a set of up to 27 new potential destinations (25 EU countries, US
and Canada) and which have previously exported elsewhere.6 Figure 1 plots
the cumulative distributions of the empirical probabilities and the probabil-
ities from random choice for a new export market to share a common border
and/or a common language with one of the ￿rm prior export destinations.
It shows that the cumulative distribution of the empirical probabilities lies
entirely to the right of the distribution of probabilities from random choice. 7
While a random choice model predicts than 90% of the ￿rms would have
less than 40% of their new destinations contiguous with a prior export mar-
ket, the data show that only 40% of the ￿rms have such a low contiguity
frequency. Contiguity seems to be a pervasive pattern in ￿rms’ export be-
havior when compared to randomness. Note that this simple statistic does
not control for country-speci￿c variables generally known to in￿uence bilat-
eral trade ￿ows from the gravity literature. This is done in the econometric
exercise in the remainder of this paper.
5The probability for a randomly chosen country to be contiguous to a prior export
destination (P
r) depends on the number of potential new export destinations ( J), the
number of potential new export destinations contiguous with a prior export destination
(k) (a subset of J) and the number of new markets that the ￿rm decides to enter ( m)
(also a subset of J). This probability P
r is given by the expected proportion of contiguous
destinations in a set of m randomly chosen countries. It is calculated using the hyperge-
ometric distribution as P










m) . The empirical probability
for a chosen country to be contiguous to a prior export destination ( P
e) is equal to the
observed frequency of the chosen export markets which are contiguous to a prior export
destination for any viable combination of J, m and k.
6This is the same subset of ￿rms we use in our empirical analysis. We provide a detailed
description of our sample in Section 4. For the sake of presentation, we have aggregated
the data at the ￿rm-destination level.
7In statistical terms, this means that the empirical cumulative distribution ￿rst order
stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution of probabilities from random choice.
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Probability of exporting to a contiguous country
Cumulative distribution of empirical probabilities
Cumulative distribution of probabilities from random choice
The empirical probabilities and the probabilities from random choice
are calculated as explained in footnote 5. Contiguity is measured by
common border and/or a common language. The sample of ￿rms is the
same as the one used in our empirical analysis. We provide a detailed
description of our sample in Section 4. For the sake of presentation, we
have aggregated the data at the ￿rm-destination level.
Figure 1: Cumulative distributions of empirical probabilities and probabili-
ties from random choice for a new export to be contiguous to one of the ￿rm
prior export markets
In this paper, we provide evidence that ￿rms expand into new foreign
markets which are geographically close and culturally related to their prior
export destinations controlling for country-speci￿c e￿ects. We present a sim-
ple model of ￿rm export behavior where the choice of new export destinations
is driven by the ￿rm export history. We derive a discrete choice model that
explicitly takes into account the possibility of the simultaneous choices of new
export destinations of ￿rms. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment, our em-
pirical strategy will gauge the relative importance of the cross-country pro￿t
correlation due to both geographical proximity and cultural closeness mea-
sured by common language, similar income levels or shared colonial past. As
we use reduced form regressions we do not rely on a speci￿c channel imposed
by an underlying structural model. Rather, we quantify the e￿ects of any
3correlation in pro￿ts across destination markets on the probability to export
to a speci￿c country, irrespective of whether it arises from the demand or
supply side. Controlling for ￿rm-product and destination speci￿c e￿ects, we
show that the probability to choose a country increases by 15 to 38 percent
for each additional prior export destination with a geographical or a cultural
link with this country.
When studying the export decision of ￿rms, one has to disentangle two
di￿erent aspects of the ￿rms’ problem: i) when to enter a new destination,
and ii) where to go. When pro￿ts are uncorrelated across destinations, the
decision problem is simple: Every market entry decision can be analyzed
on its own. Hence, the two problems of when and where to export can be
separated.8 However, if pro￿ts are correlated, these two decisions become
intrinsically related. In the presence of entry costs, ￿rms may enter new
destinations gradually to learn about their pro￿tabilities in these new mar-
kets or to adapt their products over time (see Albornoz et al., 2010; Nguyen,
forthcoming; Morales et al., 2011). Empirically, this leads to a dynamic dis-
crete choice problem. As explained by Morales et al. (2011), this problem
is formulated in a straight-forward way theoretically but quickly leads to an
empirically de facto unsolvable problem because it involves computing the
expected pro￿ts for every possible combination of time paths of entries into
destinations.9 Instead of simultaneously studying the ￿rm’s timing decision
of when to enter into a new market and its geographical location decision
driven by varying degrees of correlation between pro￿ts across markets, we
rely on an exogenous shock that has generated a massive entry of ￿rms in
a set of potential new and virgin destinations. This allows us to focus our
attention on the choice of new destinations, given an exogenous timing of
8For instance, Das et al. (2007) structurally estimate the parameters of a ￿rm’s dynamic
problem of when to start and stop exporting, irrespective of the speci￿c export market
choice.
9Therefore, Morales et al. (2011) do not solve this dynamic problem explicitly. Instead
they resort to moment inequality estimators to obtain bounds on the parameters of interest
in their structural empirical model. Their estimates based on ￿rm-level export data for
Chilean manufacturing ￿rms in the chemicals sector show that startup costs of accessing a
new country are signi￿cantly determined by the countries to which a ￿rm had previously
exported. Albornoz et al. (2010) and Nguyen (forthcoming) focus their analysis on the
timing of entry only and assume a hierarchy between countries in term of pro￿tability and
a constant pro￿t correlation across all export destinations. Together, these assumptions
elude the question of where to go.
4entry.
Since 1974, exports of Chinese textile and clothing manufacturers to the
EU countries, the US and Canada were restricted by binding import quo-
tas under the MultiFiber Arrangement/Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
(MFA/ATC) regime. The abrupt end of the quota restriction on Chinese tex-
tiles on January 1st, 2005 provides us with an exogenous increase of ￿rms’
possible export destinations, leading to a massive entry of ￿rms (Bernhofen
et al., 2011; Khandelwal et al., 2011). Our identi￿cation strategy relies
on exporters which never had a chance to obtain a quota license from the
Chinese government and could not enter these destinations despite large po-
tential pro￿ts.10 For these ￿rms, the end of the quota restriction generated
an exogenous set of potential new destinations (25 EU countries, the US
and Canada) for a large number of restricted products. This quasi-natural
experiment provides us with a clean environment to study the in￿uence of
the previous export history of non-licensed ￿rms on their export destination
choices in an exogenous set of potential new destinations during the year
2005.
Not only were the MFA quotas abruptly abolished, providing us with
an exogenous timing of entry, but also a new quota system was introduced,
limiting the ￿rms expansion for the years 2006 to 2008. Chinese exporters
did not have time to gradually learn about their pro￿tability in these new
markets or to adapt their products over time. Already at the end of 2004,
lobbying groups of the European textile industry pushed the EU commission
to impose safeguard measures.11 Additionally, it was unclear which speci￿c
textile products would be subject to a reintroduced safeguard measure. As
a result, Chinese ￿rms knew they had little time to expand and therefore
strategic gradual entry into export markets was not a viable option. As a
10Francois and Woerz (2009) show that ￿rms which were allocated quota licensed by
the Chinese government were able to extract substantial quota rents from these restricted
markets.
11Politicians also added their voices to the lobbying groups. Prominently, Jacques
Chirac, the then French President, denigrated the removal of the import quotas and
the subsequent surge in Chinese exports as ￿[a] brutal and unacceptable invasion of the
European and US markets by Chinese textiles￿ (Financial Times, April 19 2005). Strikes
of dock workers in Southern Europe in sympathy with unions from the apparel industry
took the same line (see Bloom et al., 2011).
5consequence, the EU countries, the US and Canada experienced a verita-
ble tsunami of textile and apparel products (Harrigan and Barrows, 2009).
Overall, the removal of the MFA quotas provides us with an exogenous event
that allows to disentangle the question from when to export and where to
export.
Our ￿rm-level data allow us to identify new entrants into the European,
US and Canadian markets for product categories where import quotas e￿ec-
tively prevented entry from non-licensed ￿rms. Hence, these ￿rms did not
acquire knowledge via exporting to these markets. Nevertheless, many of
them had previous export experience in other countries that were geograph-
ically close and culturally related. For example, a ￿rm may have previously
exported to Brazil. When the MFA quotas were removed in 2005, the ￿rm
could use the speci￿c knowledge acquired in Brazil to enter Portugal ￿ due
to similarity of language and culture. We make use of the export history of
Chinese exporters during the years 2000 and 2001 to identify the impact of
closeness and similarities of their prior export decisions on their new export
destination choices in 2005. The end of the quota restrictions was part of
the WTO protocol signed at the very end of 2001. In addition, the entry
of China into the WTO on December 11th, 2001 was uncertain, even at the
end of the negotiation process. Adding the di￿culty to anticipate the quota
removal due to the possible use of safeguard systems, the export decisions
made by ￿rms in 2000 and 2001 are arguably exogenous to the destination
choice made in 2005.
Learning about the spatial correlation of export decisions helps to un-
derstand cross-country correlation in pro￿ts of exporting ￿rms which are a
crucial ingredient of recent theoretical developments on export dynamics (see
Albornoz et al., 2010; Nguyen, forthcoming; Morales et al., 2011). It could
also contribute to explain the pattern of zero bilateral trade ￿ows observed
empirically (see Evenett and Venables, 2002). Understanding exporting ￿rm
behavior is also crucial from a policy perspective. If cross-country correlation
in ￿rm pro￿ts is important, it also has rami￿cations for trade liberalization
policies ￿ as reducing trade barriers between two countries can lead to more
trade with other countries nearby, even though they did not lower their trade
6barriers. This gives rise to externalities across countries. 12 Therefore, our re-
search highlights the potential for e￿ciency increases in trade liberalization
through policy coordination between countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
highly stylized model of spatial exporters. Section 3 derives an econometric
speci￿cation of the export destination choice from our model. Section 4 de-
scribes the data employed and the identi￿cation strategy. Section 5 presents
our baseline empirical results. Section 6 presents additional evidence from
multi-product ￿rms while Section 7 distinguishes between entries and exits
into contiguous markets. Section 8 contains further robustness checks. The
last section concludes.
2 A simple model of spatial exporters
The decision of a ￿rm to export a product to a new export destination j at
time t depends on its expected per period pro￿t ijt where we label every
￿rm-product couple as i. For convenience, we introduce an indicator variable
yijt which takes value 1 if the ￿rm decides to export ￿rm-speci￿c product i
to country j and 0 otherwise. Collect the set of export decisions of a single
￿rm-product couple in the vector yit = (yi1t;:::;yijt;:::;yiJt) where J is the
number of possible markets a ￿rm may choose to serve product i. Our model
can in principle also accommodate ￿rm-product and time-speci￿c numbers
of destinations Jit. For ease of exposition we stick to the assumption of the
same number of possible destinations across ￿rms.
yijt =
(
1 if ijt  0;
0 otherwise:
(1)
As can be seen from (1), we assume that ￿rms maximize their pro￿t in each
market independently of their decisions in other markets. Pro￿t maximiza-
12For instance, Borchert (2008) ￿nds that the growth of Mexican exports to Latin
America was higher for products with a large reduction in the preferential U.S. tari￿
under NAFTA. Similarly, Molina (2010) identi￿es a strong positive e￿ect of RTAs in
promoting exports outside the bloc of liberalized countries. While it is di￿cult to explain
these ￿ndings with standard trade models, they can easily be rationalized in the presence
of ￿rm-speci￿c cross-country pro￿t correlation.
7tion at the ￿rm level has to take into account the arising option value of
waiting to enter an additional export market after a ￿rst export decision, see
Morales et al. (2011).13
Taking into account the value of waiting considerably complicates the
￿rm’s problem and gives rise to a dynamic discrete choice problem. How-
ever, due to our identi￿cation strategy (discussed in detail in Section 4) we
can stick to the assumption of a myopic ￿rm in our analysis. While this
signi￿cantly reduces the complexity of the problem, we can still take into
account cross-country correlation in ￿rm pro￿ts. Additionally, it allows a
precise quanti￿cation of the e￿ect of geographical and cultural proximity on
the probability of entering a new export destination.
Alternatively, we could consider the ￿rm as being completely passive, i.e.
it is merely waiting for a foreign buyer to place her order as e.g. in Rauch
and Watson (2003). In their model, a foreign importer chooses a long-term
partner among a pool of potential exporters and maximizes its pro￿t in its
national market only. As the interdependencies of exporting pro￿ts across
markets does not matter for the importer, the observed behavior is observa-
tionally equivalent to a pro￿t-maximization of the exporter at the country
level. There would be no value in delaying entry into an export destination
and hence the ￿rm would not have to solve a dynamic optimization problem.
In a given year, the net present value of the potential ￿ow of pro￿t ijt
can be described as follows:
ijt = exp(sijt)ji   fijt: (2)
ijt is equal to the operating pro￿t minus a ￿rm-product-time-speci￿c ￿xed
cost of supplying the market which is paid each period. The single term
j captures all the destination-speci￿c variables generally known to in￿u-
ence bilateral trade ￿ows from the gravity literature such as market size,
price levels, and trade costs. i captures all facets of ￿rm-product-level het-
erogeneity such as productivity or quality as well as labor costs. Finally,
exp(sijt) is a strictly positive ￿rm-product-destination speci￿c time-variant
pro￿t shifter that captures the previous export history of ￿rm i.
13For a general introduction to option value problems see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
8We assume that pro￿t shifters sijt are correlated across export destina-
tions. In order to introduce a vector of spatially correlated pro￿t shifters in
a very simple and stylized way, we assume that the vector of pro￿t shifters





















= Wyi;t 1 + it; (3)
where yi;t 1 = (yi1;t 1;:::;yil;t 1;:::;yiL;t 1) is a (L  1) vector indicating
the ￿rm’s export status across the L potential past destinations at time t 1
and it is a (J  1) vector of iid type 1 extreme value error terms. W is a
(J  L) contiguity matrix with typical element wjl indicating the linkages
between pro￿t shifters between the J potential new export destinations and
the L potential past destinations. Equation (3) implies that a ￿rm’s past
exporting history conveys information to a ￿rm about the pro￿tability of its
products in foreign markets it has not already served and therefore in￿uences
its export decisions in the future. We can now write the pro￿t shifter for a




wjlyil;t 1 + ijt: (4)
For simplicity, we assume wjl = 1 if country j is contiguous to country l,
and 0 otherwise.14 Equation (4) reduces to
sijt = Nij;t 1 + ijt; (5)
where Nij;t 1 is the number of contiguous past export destinations of ￿rm-
product i for the new export market j.  measures the strength of the
correlation between pro￿t shifters. For simplicity, we stick to the contigu-
14Note that the model can also accommodate a continuous metric of distance in order
to construct W.
9ity matrix in our model. Our empirical results relax this assumption by
providing evidence for di￿erent measures of contiguity.
3 Econometric speci￿cation
We estimate the parameters of the pro￿t equation (2) using a discrete choice
model.15 The location choice literature makes extensive use of the condi-
tional logit model (CLM). Taking the natural log of (2) while noting that
sijt is given by equation (5) we receive:
ln(ijt + fijt) = Nij;t 1 + ~ j + ~ i + ijt; (6)
where ~ j = ln(j) is captured by country ￿xed-e￿ects controlling for time-
invariant country characteristics such as market size and distance. ~ i = ln(i)
is a ￿rm-product-speci￿c e￿ect which is the same across all possible export
destinations.
Following McFadden (1974), the estimation of a Conditional Logit Model
(CLM) requires error terms that are independent across the potential new
export destinations of the ￿rm. In our case, the crucial assumption of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives is partially solved by the introduction
of country-￿xed e￿ects which capture the unobserved country characteristics.
What is left is a possible correlation across export destinations induced by
destination-￿rm speci￿c e￿ects. We capture this aspect with the explanatory
variable Nij;t 1. Assuming that ijt is an iid error term which is distributed
type 1 extreme value with density f(ijt) = exp( ijt)exp[ exp( ijt)], a
simple conditional logit would compare the probability that ￿rm i chooses
to export to destination j 2 Jit compared to the probability to choose
another destination. Empirically, however, ￿rms may choose to start to
export to a multitude of new export destinations simultaneously. 16 In order
15Note that we use the quasi-natural setting to get rid of the dynamics. However, we
are interested in the overall correlation in ￿rm-destination pro￿tability through contiguity
between export destinations, not the di￿erential impact of the end of MFA/ATC regime.
Hence, the appropriate econometric model is a discrete choice model and not a di￿erence-
in-di￿erence estimator.
16In our data set, we observe that ￿rms which choose to export to new markets often
do so in two or three markets (see Appendix A.1).
10to re￿ect this behavior in our estimation procedure, we run a ￿xed e￿ects
logit due to Chamberlain (1980). Given that a ￿rm exports its product in
mit new destinations from Jit, the set of all possible new export destinations
for the ￿rm, this estimator models the probability to choose a combination
of countries compared to all the other possible combinations of the same















j=1 yijt(Nij;t 1 + ~ j)
; (7)
where Jit is the set of all possible combinations of export destinations given
that the ￿rm exports to mit new destinations in total and yijt is equal to
0 or 1 with
PJit
j=1 yijt = mit. As the number of potential new destinations
may vary across products (depending on the number of restricted countries),
the set of possible export destinations Jit is also ￿rm-product-speci￿c. Note
that ~ i does not appear in (7) as the ￿rm-product speci￿c e￿ect is constant
across export destinations and hence does not a￿ect the relative probability
of choosing a destination. Hence, the within ￿rm estimator also captures the
￿rm-speci￿c number of potential new export destinations.17
It is important to realize that Nij;t 1 captures the connectedness between
two foreign markets ￿ and not between the home country of the ￿rm and
another export destination. All destination-speci￿c e￿ects known to be im-
portant determinants of bilateral trade ￿ows are captured by the destination-
speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects ~ j. They also control for the general connectedness of a
country, e.g. the number of common borders with neighboring countries of
country j.
We report odds ratios of our regressions. In our case, odds ratios are
P(yijt = 1jNij;t 1+1;)=P(yijt = 1jNij;t 1;), i.e. the ratio of the conditional
probability for ￿rm i to go to country j in period t (yijt = 1) when ￿rm i
exported to Nij;t 1+1 contiguous export destinations in t 1 relative to the
conditional probability when the same ￿rm exported to Nij;t 1 contiguous
export destinations. Hence, the odds ratios reported in our results give
17For further details on ￿xed e￿ects logit estimation see Cameron and Trivedi (2005),
pp. 796.
11the increase in the probability of exporting to country j controlling for the
benchmark probability of randomly exporting to j. We cluster standard
errors at the ￿rm-level. This takes into account unobserved within-￿rm
correlation across destinations.
4 Data and identi￿cation
To bring our model to the data, we use transaction level customs data on the
universe of Chinese exporters. Our dependent variable is the ￿rm-product
speci￿c vector of export indicators yit = (yi1t;:::;yijt;:::;yiJt) which indi-
cates whether a ￿rm exports to a speci￿c destination j in t = 2005. Our data
are de￿ned at the ￿rm-product-destination level.18 We only keep products
which fall in the Harmonized System (HS) chapters of textile and clothing
products, i.e., chapters 50 to 63. For each ￿rm-destination couple, we aggre-
gate the HS-8 product level at the HS-6 digit product category, as the quota
restrictions were de￿ned at this level of disaggregation.
4.1 Identi￿cation strategy
As motivated in the introduction, we rely on an exogenous reduction in trade
barriers which allows us to disentangle the timing of the ￿rm’s decision of ex-
panding into a new market and its geographical location decision. Under the
MultiFiber Arrangement/Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (MFA/ATC)
regime, restrictions were upheld on many products even after China acceded
to the WTO on December 11th, 2001. On January 1st, 2005 the abrupt
removal of import quotas lead to the entry of a large number of ￿rms in the
then 25 EU countries, the US and Canada.19 Figure 2 shows the average
number of exporters into these markets across all restricted HS-6 products.
While around 100 to 150 ￿rms had been exporting a restricted MFA product
while the import restrictions were still upheld, this number jumped to more
18In Section 2 we assumed single-product ￿rms. Hence, in our baseline regressions we
treat every product as being exported by an independent, individual ￿rm. We relax this
assumption in Section 6 by taking into account within-￿rm across-product correlation in
pro￿tability in new export destination markets. For a more detailed description of the
data set used, see Manova and Zhang (2009).
19See Brambilla et al. (2010) and Khandelwal et al. (2011).
12than 300 in 2005. This massive entry of new ￿rms in a set of potential new
destinations gives us a quasi-natural experiment which allows us to focus
our attention on the choice of new destinations given an exogenous timing of
entry. Our identi￿cation strategy relies on old exporters which never had a
chance to obtain a quota license from their government, and could not enter
these destinations despite large potential pro￿ts.
The exogenous timing of entry is ensured because the EU countries, the
US and Canada had product-speci￿c safeguard mechanisms which were not
phased out until 2008. The possible use of these safeguard measures was
extremely likely and it was unclear which products would be a￿ected. The
expectation of the re-introduction of a new quota system after 2005 largely
limited the ￿rms’ planning horizon for a gradual geographical expansion into
new export destinations. This limits the possibility to save sunk entry costs
by delaying entry which is the driving force in the export dynamics literature.
Figure 2 also reveals that the average number of exporters across products
did not increase in 2006 so that there is no evidence of a gradual entry of
￿rms on average. This can be explained by the new and transitional license
system for textile exports that has been reintroduced in 2005 by the Chinese
government. The intention was to limit the growth of Chinese exports of
MFA products for the years 2006 to 2008. Looking back, the restrictions im-
posed in 2005 were largely ine￿ective. However, the new restrictions clearly
had an impact on the growth of Chinese textile exports for 2006 to 2008. 20
Our ￿rm-level data allow us to identify new entrants into the European,
US and Canada markets for product categories where import quotas e￿ec-
tively prevented entry from non-licensed ￿rms.
First, we identify the restricted MFA products listed by the annex of the
20China and the EU agreed in June 2005 to re-impose quotas on some products. Despite
the implementation of a new license system China did not restrict the number of the
licenses nor the volume of exports. As a reaction, EU retailers ordered colossal amounts
of Chinese textile products before the quota implementation. Only two months after the
signing of this agreement import quotas were exhausted and 80 million items of textile
and clothing products were stuck in European ports. A diplomatic solution was reached
at the beginning of September 2005 putting an end to a situation the UK press called
the ￿Bra Wars￿. The new agreement included more product categories and also relaxed
the 2005 quota limits. It was decided to use the 2005 quota surplus to calculate the 2006
quotas. In November 2005, the US also imposed restrictions on many products. These
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Notes: Yearly average number of ￿rms exporting to one EU country, the US or Canada
for HS 6-digit products for which the quota ￿ll rate was higher than 90 percent.
Figure 2: Average number of exporting ￿rms to one EU country, the US or
Canada per restricted MFA 6-digit product
WTO protocol. However, the quota restrictions vary largely across products.
Hence, for each HS 6-digit product we calculate ￿ll rates, i.e. total exports
over the quota limit. Following Evans and Harrigan (2005), we de￿ne a
quota to be binding if the ￿ll rate is higher than 90 percent. In addition, we
observe di￿erent degrees of restrictiveness in the EU countries, the US and
Canada for di￿erent products. For instance, a product may have a ￿ll rate
higher than 90 percent in the US or in Canada without necessarily being
bounded in the EU countries. To solve this issue, we calculate di￿erent ￿ll
rates for each product in each of the three distinct customs areas. 21
Second, using the ￿rm-level customs data we identify ￿rms which had
an export license for a restricted MFA product. For each HS 6-digit textile
and clothing product we track each ￿rm over the period 2000 to 2004 and
identify if it has been able to export the product in any of the countries for
which the ￿ll rate was higher than 90 percent. By this we can identify ￿rms
21In the case of Canada, we use the US ￿ll rate. Historical ￿ll rates for Canada are no
longer available from Foreign A￿airs International Trade Canada (personal communication
with Chris Brock from FAITC).
14which have never been able to export a restricted MFA product into the EU
countries, the US or Canada.
Our dependent variable corresponds to the export destination choice of
a restricted MFA product by a ￿rm which did not export this product in
any of the restricted countries during the years 2000 to 2004. As the degree
of restrictiveness in the EU countries, the US and Canada may vary across
products, the number of potential new export destinations is product speci￿c.
Overall, our sample is composed of 13,676 ￿rms which are exporting one of
their products in at least one new export destination in a set of 2, 25 or
27 possible new export destinations (25 EU countries, the US and Canada)
during the year 2005.
4.2 Construction of the contiguity measures
To construct our contiguity measures, Nij;t 1 i.e., the number of prior con-
tiguous export destinations, we make use of export decisions made by the
￿rm for a HS-6 digit product during the years 2000 and 2001. As the set
of the previous export destinations are ￿rm-product-speci￿c, so are the con-
tiguity variables. Using a four year lag between our dependent and our
explanatory variables, we arguably render our explanatory variables exoge-
nous to the choice of destinations made in 2005. In principle, there still
could be some ￿rm-product-destination learning mechanism which induces
an anticipation e￿ect that could in￿uence our results. However, as the end
of the quota restrictions was part of the WTO protocol signed at the very
end of 2001, a forward-looking ￿rm would have had to anticipate the en-
try of China into the WTO in the ￿rst place, which was a precondition for
the removal of the MFA/ATC quotas. The entry of China into the WTO
was uncertain, even at the end of the negotiation process (see Gertler, 2002,
for a summary of the negotiation process and Liang, 2002, for an in-depth
description). In addition, the end of the restrictions on MFA products in
2005 was conditional on China’s progress in removing its own trade barriers.
The ￿rm would have had to anticipate that too. Adding the di￿culty to
anticipate the quota removal due to the possible use of safeguard systems,
we believe that the export decisions made by ￿rms before January 1st, 2002
15are exogenous to the destination choice made in 2005.
As stressed above, the ￿rm’s pro￿tability will be correlated not only in
markets which are geographically proximate to its previous export destina-
tions but also in markets which share some other form of closeness, be it
because they share the same language, a common colonizer or other forms
of a shared colonial past. Therefore, our concept of the spatial dimension
is completely general and can refer to geographic as well as cultural cross-
country correlation in pro￿t shifters. In our model, we can gauge the relative




















= 1Wdistanceareayi;t 1 + 2Wcolonyyi;t 1 +  + it: (8)
This then implies the following empirical speci￿cation:
ln(ijt + fijt) = 1Ndistancearea
ij;t 1 + 2N
colony
ij;t 1 +  + ~ j + ~ i + ijt: (9)
Ndistancearea
ij;t 1 characterizes the countries’ geographical relationship to prior
export destinations of the ￿rm. It is de￿ned as the number of prior export
destinations for a ￿rm-product couple whose capital city is less than 1,500
kilometers away from the capital city of the destination under consideration.
We can also proxy for the geographical links between countries using a com-
mon border and a common continent dummy variable, which then capture
the number of prior export destinations of a ￿rm-product with a common
land-border and within a common continent with each new possible export
destination, respectively.
In addition to the contiguity matrices based on geography, we also con-
sider cultural closeness measures such as common language and common
colony between export destinations. Speci￿cally, we include the number of
all destinations to which a ￿rm exported a speci￿c product in previous peri-
16ods with colonial ties with the newly considered possible export destination.
Analogously, we construct a variable indicating the number of countries to
which a ￿rm exported a speci￿c product and which share a common language
with the potential new export destination in 2005. Finally, we include, as an
additional contiguity measure, the impact of the number of export destina-
tions which are in the same income group as a given destination (common
income group). A detailed description of the variables and summary statis-
tics for all variables can be found in the appendix.
5 Discussion of baseline results
Table 1 reports estimates of the conditional logit allowing for simultaneous
exports to multiple destinations. Speci￿cations (I) to (VII) give the esti-
mated odds ratios for the choice between all possible new additional export
destinations. We use standard errors clustered at the ￿rm level for all our
regressions. Looking at speci￿cation (I), the variable distance area controls
for prior exports in countries located within a 1,500 kilometer radius around
the capital of the chosen destination. The odds ratio of 1.346 implies an
average increase of 34.6 percent in the probability of choosing a new export
destination when we increase the number of prior export destinations which
are in a 1,500 kilometers distance area (Ndistancearea
ij;t 1 ) by one. Analogously,
speci￿cation (II) implies that if we increase the number of contiguous export
destinations that share a common border by 1, the probability of choosing a
new destination increases on average by 38.2 percent (odds ratio of 1.382). In
both cases, the estimated coe￿cient is signi￿cant on the 1 percent level. We
run separate regressions where we construct the number of contiguous coun-
tries by various contiguity measures, i.e. when export countries are located
on the same continent (speci￿cation III), share the same o￿cial language
(speci￿cation IV), are in the same income group (speci￿cation V), or have
common colonial ties (speci￿cation VI). Across all speci￿cations, contiguity
plays a signi￿cant role in ￿rms’ export location choice. In column (VII),
we include all di￿erent contiguity measures at the same time to gauge the
relative importance of the di￿erent measures. The size of some of the odds
ratios decreases but all regressors are signi￿cant at least at the 5 percent level
17except the common border contiguity. As all the countries with a common
border with a potential new destination are also located within a 1,500 kilo-
meter radius, the common border variable presented in speci￿cation (VII)
must be interpreted as the additional e￿ect generated by a land border. The
additional e￿ect appears to be negligible. The distance measures and income
groups of contiguity turn out to increase the odds ratio of choosing a country
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Notes: The black solid line gives the estimated odds ratios from a conditional logit which
includes as regressors the number of contiguous previous export destinations within 500
kilometers wide distance bands from 0 to 5,000 kilometers. The sample used is the same
as in Table 1. The gray area denotes the 95 percent-signi￿cance band using clustered
standard errors at the ￿rm level.
Figure 3: Di￿erent distance bands ranging from 0 to 5,000 kilometers in 500
kilometers steps.
Of course, the 1,500 kilometers band used to estimate the impact of the
number of previous export destinations in the same distance area is arbitrary.
Therefore, we introduce simultaneously several distance area variables with
di￿erent distance bands. Following this approach, Figure 3 reports the odds
ratios of a single regression with country ￿xed-e￿ects and with di￿erent dis-
tance bands ranging from 0 to 5,000 kilometers, in 500 kilometers steps. As
expected, the odds ratio decreases with rising distance and dies out at more



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Until now our analysis treated all exports as single-product ￿rm exports, i.e.
we only considered an export destination as contiguous if the ￿rm exported
the very same HS-6 digit product to a contiguous market previously. In
essence, we treated every product as if it were produced by a single product
￿rm. It is well known that a substantial fraction of ￿rms produce and export
multiple products, and that multi-product ￿rms make up for the majority
of sales in a given industry, see Bernard et al. (2010) and Arkolakis and
Muendler (2010). In our sample, 67% of ￿rms export in more than one HS-
6 product category. If there exists within-￿rm correlation of pro￿tability
across destination markets, then a ￿rm can infer its pro￿tability in a new
market from its previously served export markets even though the ￿rm sold
di￿erent products in these markets.
There are both supply and demand side reasons which can explain across-
product correlation in pro￿tability. When costs for product adaptation are
lower for other products within a ￿rm once they have been incurred for a
speci￿c market and product, the additional cost of adapting the product for
a similar market may be lower. In addition, when a ￿rm sells its products
under a single brand in order to bene￿t from brand loyalty of consumers,
successful exports in one product category provide information about likely
pro￿table exports across the whole product mix of a ￿rm’s brand.
We can easily extend our model to add the possibility of within ￿rm
correlation of export market pro￿tability across di￿erent product categories.
Speci￿cally, we extend our contiguity matrix W to the dimension (J LK)
where K can either be the restricted product i or any other textile and
clothing products including non-MFA products. The destination choice for
the ￿rm-speci￿c product i is now not only a￿ected by previous contiguous
export destinations for product i but possibly also by all other products i0





















= 1Wsameproductyi;t 1 + 2Wotherproductsyi0;t 1 + it: (10)
The empirical speci￿cation modi￿es to:




ij;t 1 + ~ j + ~ i + ijt; (11)
where N
sameproduct
ij;t 1 is the number of contiguous export destinations where
the ￿rm has exported product i before and N
otherproducts
ij;t 1 is the number of
contiguous export destinations where the ￿rm has previously exported prod-
ucts from other HS-6 digit categories during the year 2000-2001, including
non-MFA products. A potential concern for our identi￿cation strategy is
that multi-product ￿rms which are constrained by the MFA/ATC quotas
may also export products which do not fall under the import quotas. Hence
these ￿rms may already be present in European, US, and Canadian markets,
and our results would pick up the e￿ects of the mere presence of ￿rms in
these markets. We therefore only consider new export destinations where a
multi-product ￿rm did not sell any of its products previously.
In Table 2, we present the results for the multi-product speci￿cation.
Overall we ￿nd that expected export pro￿tabilities of a ￿rm in contiguous
countries are correlated across the ￿rm’s products but to a lesser extent than
for exports in the same product category. Looking at speci￿cation (I) for
distance area, we ￿nd that the probability of choosing a country increases
by 39.7 percent when the number of contiguous countries where the ￿rm
previously exported the same HS-6 product increases by one, whereas if it
exported other HS-6 products the probability is increased by 2.9 percent
only. Similar conclusions hold for common border and common continent.
Note that the odds ratios turn out to be close to one for other products













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22common colonizer. In speci￿cation (VII), when adding all the explanatory
variables together, the e￿ects of prior exports but in a di￿erent product
even became non-signi￿cant for all cases but common continent and common
colony. To sum up, in contrast to within-￿rm-product correlation within-
￿rm correlation of pro￿tability across destination markets is much lower
and statistically often not highly signi￿cant. This may hint at only small
economies of scope for multi-product ￿rms when entering new export markets
with several products.
7 Successful entries and failures
We can extend our theoretical framework to distinguish between the impact
of past successful entries and failures into export markets on new destination
choices. A successful entry into a foreign market implies that a ￿rm continues
to export its product after its entry period. A failure corresponds to an
entry followed by no export for this product during the following years.
Accordingly, we de￿ne the indicator variables ys
i;t 1 for success and y
f
i;t 1
for failure. Note that yi;t 1 = ys
i;t 1 +y
f
i;t 1. We can then de￿ne a vector of
pro￿t shifters which indicate contiguity to export destinations with successful
























i;t 1 + it; (12)
where W can be any weighting matrix used above.
Two di￿erent mechanisms are plausible candidates in determining the
sign of the coe￿cients s and f. A ￿rst mechanism relies on the uncertainty
of ￿rms’ pro￿tability across markets. Albornoz et al. (2010) and Nguyen
(forthcoming) assume that demand patterns are correlated across countries.
Following that assumption, a ￿rm can infer about the pro￿tability of its
product in proximate markets from its previous exports. A failure in one
23market due to unexpectedly low pro￿tability may signal that the product
of this ￿rm is likely not to be pro￿table in other similar markets. Then, a
failure in a proximate market will lead to a decrease in the probability of
entering a speci￿c contiguous destination. We expect exactly the opposite
in the case of a successful entry.
A second mechanism relies on the necessity for a ￿rm to adapt its prod-
uct when entering a new export market. Morales et al. (2011) assume that
these adaptation costs are largely reduced if the ￿rm already has entered
markets which are relatively similar. Even if a ￿rm realizes that a product
may not be sold pro￿tably in one market, and therefore decides to exit sub-
sequently, it has already sunk the investment in adapting the product. Such
a mechanism would thereby increase the probability of entering contiguous
countries independently of the success or the failure of this speci￿c entry.
In order to quantify the relative importance of these mechanisms, we
report the estimates of the following speci￿cation in Table 3:
ln(ijt + fijt) = sNsuccess
ij;t 1 + fN
failure
ij;t 1 + ~ j + ~ i + ijt: (13)
We de￿ne a success if we observe export transactions for a HS-6 digit
product to a destination j at least once in 2000 and 2001 and another time
between 2002 and 2004. A failure corresponds to an export transaction in
2000-2001 and no export reported for this product-destination during the
year 2002-2004. In column (I), we use the distance area variable and ￿nd
that the probability of entering a speci￿c market increases by 67.5 percent
when the number of successful exports in previous contiguous export desti-
nations increases by 1 (odds ratio of 1.675). The estimate is signi￿cant at
the 1 percent level. At the same time, even an additional failure in a con-
tiguous market increases the odds of entering a speci￿c market by 26 percent
(odds ratio 1.26). A positive and signi￿cant impact of the number of failures
suggests that the ‘adaptation cost’ mechanism described above is playing a
role in the choice of new destinations. We estimate the same model but use
di￿erent contiguity measures to construct the number of successes and fail-
ures, respectively, in columns (II) to (VI). For all other measures, additional




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25tering an export market by far more than previous failures. Odds ratios are
substantially higher than in Table 1. In some speci￿cations, like for common
border, common income group and common language, the failures are not
signi￿cant. In column (VII), we include all di￿erent contiguity measures in
one regression. Again, estimated odds ratios decline. It turns out that an
additional success in a proximate market increases the odds of serving a spe-
ci￿c destination for all di￿erent contiguity measures. Being located on the
same continent has the highest impact with an increase of the odds ratio by
52.9 percent. Interestingly, none of the failure variables except for distance
area is signi￿cant. As we do not ￿nd a negative coe￿cient for failures and
successes have a positive impact on the probability to enter, our results hint
at the relative importance of the adaption cost mechanism.
8 Robustness checks
We now discuss several e￿ects that could in￿uence our results and which
are unrelated to the cross-country correlation in export pro￿tability we put
forward in the preceding sections. Speci￿cally, we investigate the impact
of knowledge acquired through previous imports on the export destination
choice, the role of direct transactions, trading agents, state-owned ￿rms,
foreign-owned ￿rms and processing trade. Regression results pertaining to
these robustness checks can be found in Table 4.
Import destinations: In addition to learning from its previous export ex-
perience, a ￿rm may also gather useful information from its intermediate
input suppliers from abroad. We therefore construct N
import
ij;t 1 de￿ned as the
number of contiguous previous import destinations and include it as an ad-
ditional regressor. As imports were not restricted, ￿rms may have imported
products from export-restricted countries. Hence, we drop from our set of
potential new destinations all the countries with prior imports by the ￿rm.
As can be seen from column (I) in Table 4, contiguity between export desti-
nations still has a signi￿cant positive impact on a ￿rm’s exporting decision
even when controlling for the impact of previous import destinations. 22












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Direct transactions: A lot of exports are processed via a transfer coun-
try. For example, lots of Chinese exports enter EU countries via Rotterdam
harbor in the Netherlands. In principle, this would work against ￿nding a
spatial pattern in exports as contiguity should then only matter for previous
exporting destinations and the Netherlands. This would greatly reduce the
variation in our explanatory variables. Nevertheless, we exclude all trans-
actions for which a ￿rm uses a transfer country to export its products as a
robustness check. As can be seen from column (II) in Table 4, considering
only direct transactions hardly e￿ects our results.
Trading agents: The raw data contains a number of trading agents (￿in-
termediary ￿rms￿) which mediate trade for other ￿rms but do not directly
engage in production. Inclusion of these ￿rms could cause problems as their
behavior is probably very di￿erent from that of production ￿rms which are
the objects of this study. For example, agents could rely on knowledge across
a wide range of products and markets they acquire through their established
business networks which they can pass on to their clients. To exclude the
possibility that our results are driven by these trading agent business net-
works, we exclude trading ￿rms which are identi￿ed by certain keywords in
their names. Ahn et al. (2010) use the Chinese characters for ￿importer￿,
￿exporter￿, and ￿trading￿ to identify ￿intermediary ￿rms￿. By contrast, we
follow Bernhofen et al. (2011) and use a more comprehensive list of keywords
which are typically used by various kinds of trading agents in China. These
trading companies represent about 35 percent of our observations. Column
(III) in Table 4 shows that dropping trading agents does not change our
conclusions.
State-owned ￿rms: Our identi￿cation strategy relies on the assumption
that it was very uncertain for ￿rms whether they would obtain a license to
enter the EU countries, the US or Canada. As argued by Khandelwal et al.
(2011), state-owned ￿rms seem to have been more likely to obtain a license.
Hence, the exogeneity of the timing of entry could be questioned for these
￿rms as their higher probability of obtaining a license may have induced
them to enter export markets gradually. We therefore re-run our regressions
excluding state-owned ￿rms. Again, our results shown in column (IV) of
28Table 4 hold up excluding state-owned ￿rms.
Foreign-owned ￿rms: We exclude all foreign-owned ￿rms and the pro-
cessing trade exports as the choice of destinations of Chinese ￿rms could be
in￿uenced by the foreign headquarters location or by the location of other
foreign direct investments realized by the parent company. Results basically
remain unchanged, see column (V) in Table 4.
Processing trade: Our data-set allows us to distinguish between process-
ing and ordinary exports. The former refers to exports that are assembled in
an export processing zone and use a high share of imported intermediate in-
puts. Note that foreign owned ￿rms often engage in processing exports but
not necessarily so. Processing exports may be special with respect to the
export locations choice because they could be in￿uenced by a third foreign
party. In addition, Chinese processing trade ￿rms may have less liberty in
their export destination choice. Excluding processing trade export transac-
tions leads to around 30 percent fewer transactions. Column (VI) in Table
4 shows that our results are not driven by processing exports.
9 Conclusions
How do ￿rms choose new export destinations? While there are many factors
that are important for this decision, one empirical regularity strikes out:
Firms tend to choose new export markets that are geographically close and
culturally related to their prior export destinations.
We quantify the e￿ect of this spatial pattern using Chinese customs data.
In order to focus on the spatial dimension of new export destination choices,
we use the quasi-natural experiment of the abrupt end of the quota restric-
tions on Chinese textile exports to generate an exogenous set of potential
new destinations (25 EU countries, the US and Canada). Our research de-
sign also provides us with an exogenous timing of entry. This allows us to
study the choice of destinations without considering the impact of the timing
of entry.
Our baseline results show that the probability to export to a country
increases by 15 to 38 percent for each prior export destination with a geo-
graphical or cultural link with this country. We control for country-product
29and destination speci￿c e￿ects and account for possible multiple new export
destinations. Our results are robust to considering multi-product ￿rms, suc-
cessful entry only, imports of exporting ￿rms, the role of direct transactions,
trading agents, state-owned ￿rms, foreign-owned ￿rms and processing trade.
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32Appendices
A.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable reports ￿rms exporting a product to at least one new
destination during the year 2005. In Table 5, we aggregate our dependent
variable at the ￿rm-product level and count the number of new destinations.
22.16 percent of the ￿rm-product couples report only one new destination,
while 19.06 percent report 10 or more new destinations.
Table 5: Number of new export destinations per product-￿rm couple
# of new destinations Freq. Percent Cum.
per product-￿rm couple
1 12,400 22.16 22.16
2 7,558 13.51 35.67
3 5,697 10.18 45.85
4 4,688 8.38 54.23
5 3,810 6.81 61.04
6 3,336 5.96 67.00
7 2,863 5.12 72.12
8 2,432 4.35 76.47
9 1,998 3.57 80.04
10 and more 11,168 19.06 100.00
Notes: Table gives the number of new export destinations
in 2005. A detailed description of our sample is provided
in Section 4.
A.2 Explanatory variables
We construct di￿erent contiguity matrices W using distance area, common
border, common continent, common language and common colony conti-
guity indicators from data provided by CEPII, see Head et al. (2010) and
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
For the di￿erent contiguity measures, wjl, a typical element of W, is de￿ned
as follows:
Distance area: wjl = 1 if the bilateral distance between a pair of countries
is less than 1,500 kilometers. Bilateral distance is calculated as the great
circle distance between capital cities which uses latitudes and longitudes of
the respective city of each country.
Common border: wjl = 1 if two countries share a land border and 0 other-
wise.
33Common continent: wjl = 1 if two countries belong to the same continent
and 0 otherwise.
Common language: wjl = 1 if two countries share a o￿cial language, and 0
otherwise.
Common colony: wjl = 1 if two countries share a direct or indirect colonial
tie, i.e. have or have had a common colonizer or a colonial relationship and
0 otherwise.
Common income group: wjl = 1 if two countries are in the same income
group. The 4 di￿erent categories (very low income, low income, medium
income, high income) follow the World Bank’s 2006 World Development In-
dicators (WDI) classi￿cation.
A.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
dependent variable 1,304,363 0.059 0.236 0 1
distance area 1,304,363 0.016 0.165 0 9
common border 1,304,363 0.003 0.058 0 4
common continent 1,304,363 0.023 0.213 0 8
common income group 1,304,363 0.142 0.544 0 11
common language 1,304,363 0.021 0.192 0 11
common colony 1,304,363 0.014 0.158 0 13
Notes: Table gives descriptive statistics of the dependent and the explana-
tory variables used in our empirical analysis. A detailed description of our
sample is provided in Section 4.
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